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Lorberbaum: Israel's Constitutional Tragedy

ISRAEL’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDY
Menachem Lorberbaum* **
Sanford Levinson’s dithering between constitutional faith and
lack thereof is on target with regard to the promise extended by a
written constitution. My comments will not touch upon the
mechanics of the American constitutional system that he has so
masterfully analyzed. Rather, I will respond to the question of Israel,
mentioned but not developed in Levinson’s essay. Constitutional
theorists have at least enough faith to maintain the proposition that a
written constitution is better than none at all;1 and Israel, it would
seem, serves as a proverbial example of the failure to embrace one. 2
However, the case of Israel deserves a closer examination. In fact, I
will argue it is the attempt to foist the constitutional machinery of
judicial review upon the legal and political system in Israel that can
serve as an example of a lack of dexterity in constitutional politics.
In 1948, the newly founded State of Israel adopted the
outgoing British Mandatory Law as the law of the land, basic to its
Although this structure lacks a single
own legal system.3
constitutional document, it has developed, in time, a body of Basic
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THOUGHT (2001), co-editor of 1 THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION: AUTHORITY (Michael
Walzer et. al. eds., 2003), 2 THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION: MEMBERSHIP (Michael
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1
Patricia J. Woods, The Ideational Foundations of Israel‟s “Constitutional Revolution,”
62 POL. RES. Q. 811, 816 (2009).
2
SAMUEL SAGER, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 34 (1985).
3
SUZIE NAVOT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 21 (Kluwer Law Int’l. 2007) (2007).
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Laws and a robust tradition of court rulings on constitutional issues.4
With regard to its political structure, Israel’s parliamentary system is
a proportional one that is designed to be inclusive.5 However, due to
a threshold that is too low, the Knesset has often been plagued by
political fragmentation.6 The particular division of powers in the
Israeli polity has thus led to legal strictures (e.g., Basic Laws and
court precedents) on the one hand, and pragmatic principles (e.g., the
infamous “Status Quo” on religion and state) enabling coalition
forming and governmental stability on the other.7 Over the past few
decades, the two prongs of the system have balanced each other in
the overall public character of the polity.8
The two important axes that inform constitutional strife in
Israel are:
(1) The relation between the Jewish majority and
Palestinian minority.9 This axis has been further
acerbated since the de facto inclusion of the territories
occupied in 1967 in the life of the Israeli polity.10 Of
the entire Palestinian population under Israeli rule,
only a portion of these Palestinians are citizens of
Israel.11
(2) The relation between the secular majority and
religious minority within the Jewish population.12
In their pull and push, these two axes define the fundamental
challenge of Israeli constitutional work.13 A constitution seeking to
4

Id. at 35.
See SAGER, supra note 2, at 45 (describing Israel’s proportional system).
6
See Marcia R. Gelpe, Planned Constitution Never Got Written, But Israel Still Got
Constitutional Law, WM. MITCHELL MAG., Spring 1995, at 24, abstract available at
http://open.wmitchell.edu/facsch/108 (discussing the presence of “many actively
participating parties”).
7
Id.; Kenneth D. Wald & Samuel Shye, Interreligious Conflict in Israel: The Group Basis
of Conflicting Visions, 16 POL. BEHAV. 157, 159 (1994).
8
See Gelpe, supra note 6; Wald & Shye, supra note 7 (discussing both aspects of the
legal system).
9
Nadim Rouhana, Israel and Its Arab Citizens: Predicaments in the Relationship Between
Ethnic States and Ethnonational Minorities, 19 THIRD WORLD Q. 277, 281 (1998).
10
Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem: The Legal and Political Background, JUSTICE, Autumn 1994,
at 10, available at http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justice%20No.3%20Autumn1994.pdf.
11
Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab
Citizens of the Jewish State, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 435 (1992).
12
Wald & Shye, supra note 7, at 160.
13
Gelpe, supra note 6, at 23-24.
5
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be inclusive of the Arab minorities would be seen to downplay the
role of Jewish cultural and national hegemony in the constitution.14
Inclusivity among the Jewish population between its secular and
religious groups may seek to thicken their common Jewish values,
which could further alienate non-Jewish components from civil
society.15
In terms of their substantive values, both Arab and Orthodox
Jewish citizens may share a suspicion or questioning of the
legitimacy of secular nation-state sovereignty.16 But, in terms of
parliamentary coalition-making, their status has been dramatically
different; Arab parties (though not Arab members of the Knesset)
have almost always remained in the opposition.17 The Arab citizens,
though a significant ethnic and cultural minority, have still never
been able to transcend this fact politically as a partner in
government.18 On the other hand, Jewish religious—Orthodox—
parties have for the most part preferred to join the coalition, whatever
principled reservations they may have about the secular Zionist
enterprise.19 In fact, the Orthodox parties have often been the
tiebreakers in the system.20 Therefore, the Israeli parliamentary
system has yielded a tradition of government whereby the Arab
population has never succeeded in translating its numbers into
governmental power, while the Jewish Orthodox parties have been
advantaged in it.21 Cast in liberal terms we can say that the Israeli
system has encouraged a curious mixture of tyranny by the Jewish
majority with regard to certain civil rights of the Arab minority as
well as tyranny by the Orthodox minority vis-à-vis the larger secular
Jewish populace (especially with regard to personal status and
marriage, which is overseen by the Orthodox state rabbinate since

14
See Wald & Shye, supra note 7, at 159-60 (discussing the conflicting views regarding
the implementation of Jewish law on the state).
15
Nadim Rouhana & Asad Ghanem, The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Case
of Palestinian Citizens in Israel, 30 INT’L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 321, 323 (1998).
16
Id. at 328.
17
See, e.g., Martin Edelman, The New Israeli Constitution, 36 MIDDLE E. STUD. 1, 8
(2000).
18
Rouhana & Ghanem, supra note 15, at 328-29.
19
Edelman, supra note 17, at 3-4.
20
Id. at 10.
21
See, e.g., Rouhana & Ghanem, supra note 15, at 323 (discussing the purported lack of
equality resulting from the proportional system).
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there is no civil marriage in Israel).22
These characteristics of Israeli polity set the stage for its
unique constitutional politics. The role of the Supreme Court in such
a political system has traditionally been to serve as the arbitrator by
representing the overlapping consensus among the various elements
of civil society.23 The court here does not give voice to the
foundational moment; instead, it is a voice of equity and fairness.24
Rather than dictate a revelatory moment of constitutional
decisiveness in legal space, it lends guidance in a highly politicized
agora.25
In 1992, the Knesset passed the important Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom.26 Chief Justice Aharon Barak declared this
event a “Constitutional Revolution” and then proceeded to argue that
judicial review is analytically implied by the very concept of a
“Basic” law.27 Barak’s opponents argued that the hard-earned
parliamentary consensus enabling this legislation would actually be
used by a bench typified by liberal judicial activism to undo the
particular cultural and religious character of the Jewish public space
of Israeli society.28 In terms of the politics of constitutional law in
Israel, Barak’s self-proclaimed revolution seemed to have played into
the hands of his opposition.29
The attempt to utilize the Basic Laws to found an American
style practice of legal supremacy came at the expense of marking the
court as a side in the agora.30 Barak’s liberal activist rhetoric
rendered the court no longer eligible to serve in its traditional role as
supreme arbitrator.31 In 2000, the intifada undermined the court’s
role when most needed to help heal the fracturing of the polity’s
22

See, e.g., id.; Edelman, supra note 17, at 18-19.
Edelman, supra note 17, at 10.
24
Id. at 12.
25
Id. at 10-12.
26
Id. at 15.
27
Id. at 16-17 (quoting Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal
System as a Result of the Basic Laws and Its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal
Law, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 3, 3-4 (1997)).
28
Edelman, supra note 17, at 19-20.
29
Id. at 13.
30
See Emily Bazelon, Let There Be Law, LEGAL AFF. (May/June 2002),
http://legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2002/feature_bazelon_mayjun2002.msp.
31
See Jeffrey M. Albert, Constitutional Adjudication Without a Constitution: The Case of
Israel, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1969) (identifying the Knesset as “the state’s supreme
legal body”).
23
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legitimacy.32
The state of Israel’s most serious problem is the weakness of
its political will due to its fractured coalitional politics.33 The
ongoing “tyranny of the [Orthodox] minority” including its
disproportional access to goods in terms of distributive justice (e.g.,
draft exemption and institutional funding) and its dramatic turn to
nationalist, and at times markedly racist, sentiments has contributed
dramatically to an erosion of Israel’s civil society. 34 Until this past
Knesset, the only serious infringement of personal rights in Israeli
law was that of mandated religious marriage and that could easily be
amended by legislation enabling civil marriage.35 However, this
significant minority has no interest in the liberal constitutional
insurance of its right because the Knesset has proven the best
purveyor of its privileges.36 The coalition between racist nationalism
and Orthodoxy is the powerful drive of the present day Israeli right
and has resulted in a flood of legislative initiatives strengthening
nationalist indoctrination and curtailing freedom of speech.37 On the
other hand, it is plausibly arguable that Barak’s judicial activism,
acting as though there was a constitution when there was none, undid
the crucial role of the court in a polity founded on a significant
overlapping consensus.38 Tragically in its wake, we have witnessed
the emergence of anti-liberal and racist legislation in the heart of the
right’s agenda in Israel and not only or even primarily the religious
right.39 The old issue of the status of halakhah in secular Israel has
32

Jonathan Cook, The Myth of Israel‟s Liberal Supreme Court Exposed, MIDDLE E. RES.
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022312.
33
Steven Plaut, The Supreme Need to Fix the Israeli Supreme Court, ISRAPUNDIT (Jan. 5,
2012), http://www.israpundit.com/archives/42611.
34
See Joshua Mitnick, Israel‟s Unity Government: A Bid to Represent the Majority, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 9, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2012/0509/Israel-s-unity-government-a-bid-to-represent-the-majority (discussing the
issues created by proportional representation); see also Bazelon, supra note 30
(exemplifying the tension between Orthodox and democratic principles in several court
rulings).
35
Raanan Ben-Zur, Aharon Barak: Don‟t Leave Marriage in Hands of Religious,
YNETNEWS.COM (May 14, 2008), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3542718,00.html.
36
Cf. Danny Danon, Democracy Is Alive and Kicking in the Knesset, THE JERUSALEM
POST (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=257243.
37
Bazelon, supra note 30.
38
See Woods, supra note 1, at 811 (discussing Barak’s view that “every issue—including
the political—is justiciable”).
39
See, e.g., Donald Macintyre, „Racist‟ Marriage Law Upheld by Israel, COMMON
DREAMS (May 15, 2006), http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0515-05.htm.
AND INFO. PROJECT
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given place to a much more pernicious undertaking of unraveling its
civil society.40 The neo-con Likud Party is very weak in its face and
there is no longer a supreme court to act as a break.41
Still, we recently have witnessed the court striking down the
law addressing the exemption of ultra-Orthodox students from
military service as unconstitutional.42 This might point to a
reassertion of the court’s stature as supreme legal interpreter, even if
no longer moral arbitrator, of Israeli civil society.

40

See Albert, supra note 31, at 1261 (“[T]he short term prospects for broad invocation of
Hebrew law as a source of constitutional principle are probably dim.”).
41
Mitnick, supra note 34; Cook, supra note 32.
42
Bill Steiden, Around the World, THE ATLANTA J. CONST., July 8, 2012, at 12A 2012
WLNR 14207207.
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